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Turkey and Iran have for centuries maintained an uneasy relation-ship of conflict and cooperation, shaping the history of the Middle 
East. This article focuses particularly on 
the development of the relationship since 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.  The 
analysis shows that the Turkish-Iranian 
relationship can be described as a “structural 
regional rivalry” whose intensity and issues 
are determined by conjectural changes at the 
systemic and sub-systemic levels. Although 
the historical analysis shows a tendency for 
rivalry, there have been occasional oppor-
tunities for close cooperation, such as the 
rapprochement since the early 2000s. To 
account for the dynamics that produce either 
cooperation or conflict, we first analyze 
historical processes and the changing factors 
that have shaped the relationship. Then we 
turn to the post-revolutionary period and the 
factors that produced economic cooperation 
from 1979 to 1988, rivalry and conflict from 
1988 to 2002, and rapprochement since 
2002. The analysis shows that, although the 
long-term nature of Turkish-Iranian rela-
tions is one of rivalry, when certain factors 
emerge, the two neighbors can engage in 
close cooperation. 
CONSTANTS 
 Six factors have shaped the course of 
relations between Turkey and Iran since 
the sixteenth century. The first is geo-
politics.1 Both countries’ vast territories 
allowed them to exert influence on the 
Middle East, Central Asia and the Cau-
casus. They both have been considered 
“gateways” to Central Asia and the Cau-
casus and have been major actors in the 
Middle East. Iran’s geography appeared to 
be an advantage in influencing both Mus-
lim (especially Shia) and non-Muslim na-
tions in Central Asia and the Caucasus and 
in controling oil-rich regions such as the 
Persian Gulf. Similarly, Turkey’s eastern 
border connects it to historically important 
trade routes across Asia, and the country is 
strategically located around five major seas 
that are vital for trade and energy trans-
portation: the Caspian, Black, Marmara, 
Aegean and Mediterranean.2 These advan-
tages had their downsides. Iran became a 
playground for great-power politics during 
the nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century, suffering from British-
Russian rivalry in and around Central Asia 
and the Middle East.  Great-power politics 
of the period also weakened the Ottoman 
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Empire’s control over its territories. There-
fore, geopolitics created a natural rivalry 
between Turkey and Iran for control of the 
Middle East and Central Asia.3  
 The second recurring pattern in 
Turkish-Iranian relations concerns ethnic 
minorities. Both countries are multi-ethnic 
in character and include similar ethnic 
groups, such as Azeris and Kurds. Iran’s 
Azeris are estimated to constitute more 
than 25 percent of the population, while 
about 15 percent of the population of Tur-
key is Kurdish.4 Iran was ruled by minority 
Turkic dynasties from the early sixteenth 
to the twentieth century,5 and even after 
the establishment of Persian control, Iran 
has maintained caution about potential 
irredentism from the Azeri minority in the 
north. In Turkey, after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, Kurds became the largest 
minority; they revolted against the central 
government at various times in the 1920s, 
1930s and 1980s. Iran’s minorities also in-
clude Kurds on the western border, as well 
as Arabs, Gilaki, Mazandarani, Baloch, 
Turkmen and some Christians. The Otto-
man Empire claimed that Iran helped its 
Armenian population to revolt during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries.6 In addition, the empire always feared 
Iran’s influence on groups such as Shia, 
Alevi or Qizilibash in Turkey. 
 The third issue is the significant 
cultural divide between the two countries. 
Each one championed the leadership of a 
major sect of Islam during the period of 
the Ottoman and Safavid empires. A com-
petition for leadership of the Muslim world 
was one of the determining factors in their 
relations, generating a series of diplomatic 
competitions and military conflicts begin-
ning in the sixteenth century.7 At the peak 
of these conflicts, the Ottoman Sultan, 
Selim I, defeated the Safavids in 1514. 
During the nineteenth century, nationalism 
also was a major problem between the two 
countries. Pan-Turkism has always been a 
source of worry for Iran, due to the large 
number of Azeris and other Turkic peoples 
within the country. For example, the Young 
Turk movement’s pan-Turkism in the early 
twentieth century was a major source of 
confrontation between the two countries. 
Similarly, when the Soviet Union dissolved 
during the 1990s, Iran’s policy makers 
feared separatist movements among the 
country’s Azeri population. Each country 
has been suspicious of the others meddling 
with its minorities and promotion of its 
religion or nationality in the region.      
 Over the centuries, political and ideo-
logical rivalries have been related to the 
cultural divides between Iran and Turkey. 
From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, 
Shia Safavids and Qajars in Iran and Sunni 
Ottomans competed for the leadership of 
the Muslim world. Pan-Turkist movements 
in the early twentieth century were a night-
mare for Iranians, while the Pan-Islamism 
of the Young Turks received mixed reac-
tions among the Iranian elite.8 Ottoman 
Sultan Abdulhamid II’s efforts to arouse 
the Shia clergy (Mujahedin) in Iraq against 
the Iranian regime and his aspiration to 
unite the Muslim world under Ottoman rule 
were not welcomed by Iran’s rulers. After 
constitutional revolutions in Iran (1905) 
and Turkey (1908), the two countries took 
different paths in their regime choices. The 
young Turkish Republic tried unsuccess-
fully to influence Reza Shah Pahlavi to es-
tablish republican rule in Iran. The founder 
of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, articu-
lated his disappointment that the shah chose 
dynasty instead of a republic in 1925.9 
 The two countries maintained rather 
friendly relations under shah’s regime, 
although they presented two different 
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There is a common belief in Turkish public 
opinion that, since there have been no 
major wars between the two countries in 
the last three centuries, border problems 
also do not exist. In reality, the two coun-
tries have engaged in armed conflicts many 
times since 1639, and there were some 
serious border problems. For example, in 
1930, during a Kurdish rebellion in Ağrı, 
a province in eastern Turkey, the Turk-
ish government protested that the rebels 
were given free passage from the Iranian 
border.14 Turkey and Iran signed a formal 
agreement that changed the border in 1931, 
making it easier for Turkey to protect.15 
 A sixth durable factor consists of the 
economic ties and trade between the two 
countries.  Turkey and Iran began the 
twentieth century with similar underdevel-
oped, pre-industrial economies and agrarian 
societies. Under Shah Mohammed Reza’s 
White Revolution, Iran achieved impressive 
economic reforms and high growth, fueled 
by the country’s vast petroleum resources 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Iran was 
considered to be an economic success in 
the region. During the same period, Turkey 
maintained an import-substitution growth 
strategy, which seemed less successful. 
However, in the early 1980s, Turkey initi-
ated liberal reforms and pursued an export-
oriented growth, which brought substantial 
economic expansion, especially in the 
2000s. In the 1980s, during the war with 
Iraq, Iran depended on imports from Tur-
key, paid for by oil. Since the mid-1990s, 
Turkey and Iran have signed a series of 
agreements on energy transportation from 
Iran to Turkey and other European markets.   
VARIABLES
 In addition to the six durable factors 
shaping relations between the two countries 
over the past half millennium, important 
models to the Muslim world. While Iran 
pursued modernization under an authori-
tarian monarch, Turkey modernized its 
economy and social life and established a 
multi-party democracy after 1946. During 
World War II, Iran was occupied by the Al-
lies, while Turkey managed to stay neutral. 
After the war, Turkey joined the Western 
alliance, and Iran maintained a balance 
between Western and Eastern blocs until 
the late 1960s. During the 1970s, Shah 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi pursued a pro-
American foreign policy, which came to 
an abrupt end with the Islamic Revolution. 
Iran’s breaking its ties with the Western 
world and NATO exacerbated the ideologi-
cal divide between the two countries, given 
Turkey’s position in NATO. Turkey’s secu-
lar elite suspected the Iranian revolutionar-
ies’ aspirations to promote similar Islamist 
movements in the region.10 Iran, on the 
other hand, blamed Turkey for harboring 
Iranian refugees, whose number was esti-
mated at 600,000 to 1 million. These were 
allegedly members of the Mujahedin-el-
Khalq, a dissident group that opposed the 
mullah regime, as well as other pro-shah 
armed groups in Turkey.11 
 Thus, Turkey and Iran found them-
selves once again on opposite sides of 
a political dispute during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, a period 
in which the military control of the Turk-
ish polity was at its peak, exacerbating the 
ideological conflict with Iran.12 In their re-
gional competition, Turkey presented itself 
as a successful example of secularism and 
democracy, while Iran considered itself the 
champion of Islamism.
 Border problems have also been sig-
nificant sources of confrontation. Today’s 
border was, to a great extent, determined 
in 1639 by the Kasr-ı Şirin agreement 
between the Ottomans and Safavids.13 
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Middle East, engaged in a prolonged war 
with Iraq, and destroyed its former cordial 
relations with the United States and Israel. 
These developments, of course, diminished 
the importance of the “Turkish threat” for 
Iran. The new regime’s threat perception of 
Turkey was diminished.  
 When the USSR collapsed, Iran found 
itself in a very difficult international posi-
tion. Being one 
of the few major 
challengers to 
the only super-
power was not 
easy. The United 
States not only 
challenged Iran 
on various issues 
in the region, it 
also supported 
Turkey and the “Turkish model” as a 
secular, modern Muslim country against 
the Islamic regime.19 Iran was regularly 
excluded from gas and oil projects, and 
Turkey was supported. Washington also 
maintained pressure on Iran (and Iraq) 
with the implementation of a policy of 
“dual containment.”20 These develop-
ments led Iran to pursue better relations 
with Russia.21
 Political changes in the Middle East, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus also appear 
to be important determinants of Turkish-
Iranian relations in the post-revolution 
era. First, war with Iraq and isolation by 
the West led Iran to pursue better relations 
with Turkey in the 1980s on trade and 
other economic issues. During this period, 
Iran also supported non-state armed groups 
and terrorist organizations throughout the 
region and championed Islamism against 
Western governments, Israel and the 
secular-nationalist establishment in Middle 
Eastern states.22 Iran supported Hezbollah 
variables must be considered. For example, 
superpower penetration into the region has 
changed the nature of the Turkish-Iranian 
rivalry. Beginning in the early 1800s, 
Britain and Russia were involved in the 
so-called Great Game for the control of 
Central Asia. This rivalry shaped the threat 
perception of Iranian policy makers. With 
imperial Britain and Russia in the region, 
the Ottoman 
Empire seemed 
a lesser threat to 
Iranians — and 
vice versa.16 Such 
changes in threat 
perception, how-
ever, did not cause 
a rapprochement 
between Iran and 
Turkey. They 
continued to undermine each other’s sov-
ereignty and play the superpowers against 
each other. Iran’s support for Armenian 
independence during the late nineteenth 
century, along with Russian attempts to gain 
advantages over Turkey during the Berlin 
conference of 1878 and through the Sèvres 
Treaty of 1920, are some examples.17
 Relations with great powers have been 
decisive in two different ways. In some 
instances, great-power politics caused 
rapprochement between Turkey and Iran, 
as during the Cold War, when they were 
members of the Central Treaty Organiza-
tion (CENTO).18 At other times, great-
power involvement sharpened the rivalry, 
as has occurred in Central Asia during the 
post-Cold War era. The most serious crisis 
in the relationship was brought about by 
the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which 
completely changed Iran’s priorities and 
alliances. In its post-revolutionary foreign 
policy, Iran tried to influence Shia groups 
to spread the Islamic Revolution across the 
Iran’s staunch enemies, the Taliban 
and Saddam Hussein, were both 
toppled by the United States. 
However, these changes also led 
Iranian policy makers to perceive 
the United States as an even 
greater threat. 
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diverged completely. While Iran has main-
tained contentious policies toward Amer-
ica and even Russia, Turkey continues 
to be part of the Western alliance, NATO 
and Europe. The revolution led America 
to redefine its alliances in the region 
and maintain even closer relations with 
Turkey. Despite the changing character 
of the state and its foreign policy, as well 
as ideological and religious differences, 
when faced with political and economic 
isolation and a bitter war with Iraq, Iran 
reluctantly turned to Turkey for economic 
and strategic connections.
The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 
 The first decade of Turkish-Iranian 
relations after the revolution was marked 
by the Iran-Iraq War and a willingness 
to cooperate in trade and economic rela-
tions. In fact, the initiative that started the 
relationship with the Islamic regime came 
from Turkey. On February 14, 1979, only 
three days after the Islamic Revolution’s 
“victory day,” Turkey recognized the new 
regime almost instantly. The new Iranian 
government saluted Turkey’s recogni-
tion and announced that leaving CENTO 
would not weaken relations between the 
two countries.27 There were many reasons 
that Turkey acted so quickly to recognize 
Iran. First, Turkish Prime Minister Bül-
ent Ecevit was a fierce critic of the shah’s 
regime and the CENTO alliance.28 Second, 
Turkish policy makers have always been 
concerned about civil war and the possible 
disintegration of Iran, which might have 
led the USSR to intervene and might have 
precipitated Kurdish separatism at Turkey’s 
eastern border.29 Also, Turkey foresaw that 
a weaker Iran could become a good trading 
partner. Turkey also realized that Iran’s 
shift to an anti-Western posture would 
benefit Turkey in the long run. Turkey’s 
in Lebanon and the anti-Turkey actions 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 
Northern Iraq in the early 1980s.23 On the 
other side of the border, about a million 
Iranians who had fled the country after the 
revolution used Turkey for safe passage 
to Europe and the United States. At the 
regional level, an Iran-Syria alliance that 
began in the early 1980s was balanced by 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation in military, se-
curity and economic matters in the 1990s.24 
 During the 1990s, the instability 
caused by the emergence of the newly 
independent states in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia also contributed to Turkish-
Iranian rivalry. Turkey presented itself as 
a model in terms of democratization and 
liberal economy, while Iran promoted an 
image that combined religious and ideo-
logical factors, as well as some economic 
benefits.25 The political shifts of the early 
2000s brought both risks and opportuni-
ties to Iran. On the one hand, its staunch 
enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, 
were both toppled by the United States. 
However, these changes also led Iranian 
policy makers to perceive the United 
States as an even greater threat. The Iraq 
War also exacerbated Turkish-American 
relations because the Turkish parliament 
voted against joining the U.S.-led coali-
tion in March 2003.26
POST-REVOLUTION RELATIONS 
 With the end of the shah’s regime, 
Iran’s foreign policy took a significant 
turn, changing almost over night from a 
key Western ally into one of the fiercest 
challengers of American hegemony. This 
shift in Iran has redefined its relations 
with Turkey. In addition to the Sunni-Shia 
division, which was deemed particularly 
important by the mullahs, the foreign-
policy orientation of the two countries also 
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concerned about Iran’s alliance with the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
its support for the PKK.34
 After the first half of the 1980s, 
Turkish-Iranian relations were marred by 
difficulties related to ideological differ-
ences. Iran, as the self-proclaimed world 
leader of Islam, repeatedly protested the 
secularist policies and Kemalist establish-
ment in Turkey, including the headscarf 
ban in Turkish universities.35 Remarks by 
high-level Iranian officials caused protests 
from various actors in Turkey, including 
the social-democratic opposition party 
(SHP). For example, in January 1987, 
SHP chairman Erdal İnönü criticized 
Iranian officials for intervening in the 
domestic affairs of Turkey.36 The period of 
1988-89 was a time of strained diplomatic 
relations and the recalling of the two coun-
tries’ ambassadors.
 During this period, regional political 
changes were also significant. Iran ap-
proached Syria, and an alliance between 
the two countries against the U.S. and Isra-
el began in the early 1980s. With Iran’s as-
sistance, Syria helped establish anti-Israel 
organizations in Lebanon, such as Hezbol-
lah.37 Such anti-Israeli policies and rhetoric 
increased the Iranian regime’s legitimacy. 
By making use of anti-Israeli sentiments in 
the region and the Iraq-Syria competition, 
Iran effectively broke its isolation and was 
able to pursue its foreign policy. On the 
other hand, systemic factors in this period 
favored Turkey. The United States reacted 
to the Islamic Revolution by improving its 
relations with Turkey even more and sent 
its Rapid Deployment Force to the Persian 
Gulf to counter Iran. The United States 
also asked Turkey for military bases and 
transferred its intelligence stations from 
Iran to Turkey. As Iranian-U.S. relations 
first reaction to the Iranian Revolution was 
based on calculations about the regional 
rivalry between the two countries. How-
ever, Turkish policy makers have also been 
concerned about the weakened governmen-
tal structure in Iran, fearing instability.
 Only one year after the revolution, in 
September 1980, the Iran-Iraq War began. 
For Iran, the war with Iraq to its west and 
the American presence in the Gulf made 
economic cooperation with Turkey a vital 
issue. Iran needed to use Turkish ports in 
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean for 
strategic imports in its war effort. It bought 
goods from Turkey in return for oil and gas 
in the early 1980s.30 For Turkey, trade with 
Iran was necessary to boost its own bank-
rupt economy. Such increased trade was 
in line with the liberal economic reforms 
in the early 1980s carried out by Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal. In this period, the 
volume of trade between the two countries 
exceeded $2 billion,31 consisting mainly 
of oil sales by Iran in return for Turkish 
goods and technical assistance. 
 During the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey 
maintained a strict neutrality and improved 
its economic relations with both neighbors, 
especially Iran.32 Turkey’s neutrality was 
welcomed in both Iran and the Arab world. 
However, when Turkey attempted to medi-
ate the conflict, it did not succeed. Despite 
developments in trade relations, problems 
arose between Ankara and Tehran in the 
mid-1980s over PKK terrorism in Turkey 
and Iran’s efforts to spread the Islamic 
Revolution in the region. As PKK attacks 
increased, Turkey conducted raids in 
Northern Iraq to pursue militants, claiming 
its operations were only for “hot pursuit” 
in line with international law.33 Iran pro-
tested Turkey’s operations in Northern Iraq 
and voiced suspicions about its aims. On 
the other hand, Turkish policy makers were 
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in the competition for influence. Turkey 
presented Central Asia with the so-called 
“Turkish model,” emphasizing ethnic Tur-
kic ties, secularism, integration into West-
ern economic and political institutions, and 
increased trade and cultural ties. Turkey’s 
success in the region was mixed. It did 
not appear to be the main influence in the 
regional rivalry; however, the pessimistic 
prediction that Turkey would become ir-
relevant and loose all ground to Russia and 
Iran did not come true, either.38 Turkey was 
successful in improving its relations, espe-
cially in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and has 
shown a significant presence in Turkmeni-
stan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 The most important factor behind 
Turkey’s success has been Western support 
for its increased role in Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus. A second major factor 
has been the U.S. policy of isolating Iran 
and promoting the Turkish model in order 
to limit Iranian and Russian influence. The 
United States supported Turkey’s political, 
economic and military influence in these 
two regions. For example, Washington ve-
hemently opposed the transport of Caspian 
oil and gas through Iran, instead support-
ing projects that would go through Turkey, 
and prevented countries like Georgia and 
Armenia from developing stronger eco-
nomic and political ties with Iran.39 
 Iran, on the other hand, has attempted 
to create its own spheres of influence and 
alliances against Turkish-Western penetra-
tion into the region. From the early 1990s, 
Iran ceased the “small-Satan” rhetoric 
against Russia and developed closer ties 
with it against Turkey and the United 
States. Iran’s approach to the Central 
Asian Turkic republics included promot-
ing Islamic ideology, supporting Islamist 
movements and developing some eco-
nomic relations through energy trade. This 
worsened, Turkey appeared to be the most 
important ally of NATO and the United 
States in the region. 
The Post-Soviet Space, 1988-97
 Significant developments toward the 
end of the 1980s changed the regional 
dynamics as well as the course of Iran-
Turkey relations. First, in 1988, after eight 
years of fierce fighting, the Iraq-Iran War 
ended in a status quo ante bellum, al-
though both sides claim victory to this day. 
Iran’s Supreme Leader Khomeini died in 
1989, succeeded shortly afterward by Ali 
Khamanei. The end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of the USSR were the most 
important systemic changes affecting Tur-
key-Iran relations. In addition to the chal-
lenges caused by the Islamic Revolution, 
the constants of Turkey-Iran relations, in 
the form of cultural, political and ideologi-
cal rivalries, rose to the surface. Turkey 
and Iran found themselves in competition 
for their influence over Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus.    
 The collapse of the USSR and the in-
dependence of Azerbaijan were difficult for 
Iranian officials to cope with. About a quar-
ter of Iran’s population are Azeris living in 
the north of the country, which is historical-
ly called southern Azerbaijan. An indepen-
dent state of Azerbaijan was perceived as a 
serious threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. 
Moreover, Iran realized the importance of 
spreading its influence in the post-Soviet 
space, especially in the newly independent 
Muslim Turkic states of Central Asia.
 Turkey, as a NATO member and Eu-
ropean Union aspirant, certainly found the 
new developments more beneficial for it-
self. Despite early fears that the end of the 
Cold War would diminish Turkey’s strate-
gic position in the region, Ankara quickly 
realized that there were new opportunities 
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ian borders, making it very difficult for 
the Turkish armed forces to pursue them. 
Turkish incursions into northern Iraq, and 
occasionally Iranian territory, were con-
demned by the Iranian government. During 
the pursuit of PKK members, the Turkish 
forces carried out bombings at the Turkey-
Iran border, which caused protests by Iran. 
In July 1996, the activities of PKK guer-
rillas who crossed the Iranian border and 
attacked Turkish military posts led to a se-
rious crisis between the two countries that 
could have turned into an armed conflict.40 
 Turkey, on the other hand, attempted 
to obtain support from Syria and Iran in its 
fight against the PKK. Exploiting concerns 
that an independent Kurdistan could cause 
Iraq to disintegrate, Turkey initiated three-
party talks with Iran and Syria to observe 
the situation in Iraq. These meetings reas-
sured the three countries of their joint in-
terest in the territorial unity of Iraq. During 
these meetings, Turkey also warned Iran 
about PKK activities in the region. How-
ever, full cooperation with Iran against the 
PKK was never achieved. On the contrary, 
Iran and Turkey engaged in a proxy war in 
Northern Iraq during this period. During 
the civil war between two principal Kurd-
ish groups in Northern Iraq, Iran supported 
Jelal Talabani’s PUK and the PKK, while 
Turkey supported Massoud Barzani’s KDP 
against the other two.41 Turkey’s incur-
sions into Iraq, with 35,000 troops in 1995 
and 50,000 in 1997, were condemned by 
Tehran. Iranian officials argued Turkey’s 
invasions were not only a violation of 
international law, but the sovereign rights 
and territorial integrity of the Muslim 
Iraqi nation. When Turkey accused Iran of 
supplying bases, transportation, medicine, 
hospitals and uniforms, Iran denied the al-
legations and blamed them on the Turkish 
military, Israel and the United States.42 
shifted the focus of Turkey-Iran competi-
tion from south to north. 
 The Gulf War of 1990-91 changed the 
dynamics in the region. After its invasion 
of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, one of 
the leading military powers in the region, 
controlled the world’s second largest oil 
reserves. Iran and Turkey approached this 
crisis differently. Under the active lead-
ership of President Turgut Özal, Turkey 
joined the international coalition. Özal 
considered that the Gulf War and the 
U.S. need to use Turkey’s military bases 
presented a great opportunity to reassert 
Turkey’s strategic position in the post-Cold 
War world. Iran, on the other hand, took a 
very pragmatic approach. Although some 
expected the Islamic Republic to support 
Iraq as an example of Muslim solidarity 
against the United States, Tehran preferred 
to stay neutral during a conflict that would 
weaken their greatest adversary in the re-
gion. Such developments also strengthened 
the loose alliances between Iran and Syria 
and Turkey and Israel. Turkish-Israeli co-
operation in military technology and intel-
ligence, which was strongly supported by 
the United States, was repeatedly protested 
by Iran and Syria. 
 Turkey’s biggest worry following 
the Gulf War was PKK terrorism, which 
peaked in the 1992-95 period. By using the 
vacuum created by the United States and 
its allies north of the thirty-sixth parallel in 
Iraq, the PKK operated freely and con-
ducted its largest attacks on Turkey. An-
kara attempted to end Iranian and Syrian 
support for the PKK through diplomatic 
efforts, but these did not prove effective. 
Against Turkish-Azeri cooperation on 
energy transportation, Iran used the PKK 
card to destabilize the region, particularly 
its oil pipelines. PKK fighters were able 
to freely cross the Iraqi, Iranian and Syr-
109
Özcan / Özdamar: Turkish-iranian relaTions since The 1979 islamic revoluTion
Turkish military bureaucracy.44 Erbakan’s 
tenure was too short to establish a sustain-
able change in the course of relations and 
failed to reconcile two countries’ interests.  
  
 Domestic Political Challenges, 1997-2002
 The Kurdish and Islamist questions 
continued to challenge Turkish-Iranian 
relations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
In fact, this period witnessed the worst of 
all crises in Turkish-Iranian relations since 
the revolution in 
1979. In February 
1997, the Turk-




to sign a National 
Security Council 
document aimed at fighting against “Is-
lamist reactionary movements” operating 
in Turkey. Political developments in the 
following months led Erbakan to resign in 
June, and his Welfare Party (RP) was shut 
down by the courts the following year. 
This period in Turkish history, involving 
a power struggle between the secularist 
military and an Islamist prime minister, 
is called “ the February 28 coup,” or “the 
post-modern coup” by some academics. 
The military’s influence on the domestic 
and international affairs of Turkey contin-
ued in the following years, although the 
secularist Yılmaz and Ecevit governments 
succeeded that of Erbakan. 
 TAF influenced Turkey’s defense and 
foreign policies to a great extent during 
this period, when its most serious interna-
tional challenges were relations with Iran 
and Syria. The two gravest problems in 
Turkey — the Kurdish question and the 
Islamist challenge — were both related 
to Iran’s policies.45 Turkey’s dissatisfac-
 Finally, this period witnessed the ex-
acerbation of ideological rivalries between 
the two countries.  In the early 1990s, 
Turkey experienced the political murders 
of several journalists, opinion leaders, and 
other public figures, causing a huge stir in 
the country. These intellectuals were exclu-
sively secularists and leftists who opposed 
Islamic political movements and Iran’s 
policies in the region. The suspects in these 
assassinations had allegedly been trained 
in Iran. For exam-
ple, on February 
4, 1993, Minister 
of Internal Affairs 
İsmet Sezgin an-
nounced that the 
suspects of two 
high-profile as-
sassinations were 
trained at a military base “located between 
Tehran and Qom” in Iran.43 The assassina-
tion of well-known journalist Uğur Mumcu 
in January 1993, which caused the largest 
public protests of its kind, was also alleg-
edly connected to the Iranian state. Tehran 
repeatedly denied any connection to these 
assassinations and to date, connections 
between the Iranian government and the 
political assassinations of secular thinkers 
in Turkey have not been proven.
 The political chill started thawing 
during the tenure of the first Islamist prime 
minister of Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan, 
who visited Tehran during August 1996 
and signed various economic agree-
ments. One of these included a natural-
gas purchase of 10 million cubic meters 
(worth $23 billion) effective until 2002. In 
December 1996, Turkey and Iran signed 
five new agreements concerning economic 
relations. The desire of Erbakan’s govern-
ment to extend cooperation to the military 
and defense sectors was opposed by the 
The political chill started thawing 
during the tenure of the first Islamist 
prime minister of Turkey, Necmettin 
Erbakan, who visited Tehran during 
August 1996 and signed various 
economic agreements. 
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political and military training from Iranian 
security and intelligence forces, worked as 
spies for the Iranian government and were 
involved in political killings in Turkey dur-
ing the 1990s.50 
 The period from 1997 to 2000 wit-
nessed perhaps the most tumultuous events 
in Turkish-Iranian relations for three 
decades. However, regional, systemic and 
domestic developments in 2000-02 led Iran 
to reduce tensions with Turkey. First, the 
political conflict among the Iranian elite 
in this period focused on Iran’s domestic 
dynamics. On the other hand, PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan’s expulsion from Syria 
in 1998 and his capture by Turkey in 1999 
triggered a series of regionwide Kurd-
ish demonstrations and unrest.  All these 
events led Iranian policy makers to realize 
the PKK’s influence on the Kurds in Iran. 
Fearing a general Kurdish movement in 
the region and a separatist one on its own 
soil, Iran decreased its support for the PKK 
significantly. Tehran became even more 
concerned after the 9/11 attacks and the 
possibility of an American invasion of Iraq 
because such an invasion, if carried out in 
cooperation with Turkey, would increase 
Turkey’s control over Northern Iraq and 
diminish Iran’s influence over regional 
politics. In addition, Iran realized that, as a 
result of 9/11, cooperation between Turkey 
and Israel and their relations with the Unit-
ed States had intensified.51 Also, increased 
military cooperation and Israel’s growing 
military presence in Turkey reinforced wor-
ries in Tehran that this alliance could be 
used against Iran. Taking all these factors 
into account, Iran decided to suspend rela-
tions with the PKK until regional develop-
ments, such as a possible U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq, became clearer. The eighth joint 
security meeting of the Turkey-Iran Com-
mission on Security Cooperation, held in 
tion with Iran’s influence was not limited 
to the Kurdish matter. Iran was vilified by 
Turkish secularist and mainstream media 
because it allegedly supported Islamist 
movements and even the Kurdish Hezbol-
lah that was operating in Turkey.46 An im-
portant example of Iran’s becoming a locus 
of domestic political conflict in Turkey 
was a crisis that involved Iran’s ambas-
sador to Ankara, Mohammed Bagheri. He 
was asked to leave Turkey in 1997 after a 
speech in which he supported the Islamist 
movements in Turkey. He also promoted 
the establishment of an Islamist system in 
Turkey and openly criticized its secular-
ism. In retaliation, Iran expelled the Turk-
ish ambassador to Tehran the same year.47 
 The next crisis involved a female 
Islamist member of the Turkish parlia-
ment, Merve Kavakçı.  Kavakçı attended a 
parliamentary session wearing a headscarf, 
which caused an uproar in secular circles. 
When the secularists protested against her, 
and she was not allowed to be sworn in, 
Islamist circles in Turkey were outraged. 
The Kavakçı affair continued for several 
months and became a focus of attention for 
the international press, including Iran’s.  
The protests against Kavakçı were severely 
criticized by the Iranian media, and of-
ficials such as Foreign Minister Kamal 
Kharazi openly criticized secularism in 
Turkey.48 Iranian students in Tehran demon-
strated for the freedom of Turkish women 
to wear the headscarf. During this period, 
the two countries’ media engaged in a “war 
of bombast.” Prime Minister Ecevit blamed 
Iran for trying to export its Islamic regime 
and continuing to support the PKK.49 Final-
ly, the Turkish government’s crackdown on 
an Islamist terrorist organization, the Kurd-
ish Hezbollah, further worsened relations 
between the two countries. Turkish officials 
claimed that leaders of Hezbollah received 
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September 11 attacks in the United States. 
The general perception has been that Iran 
became more aggressive post-9/11 in its 
dealings with the Middle East and the 
United States. Iran continued to support 
Palestinian groups and Hezbollah with 
weapons and built up its nuclear program 
and missile systems. It also increased its 
presence in post-invasion Iraq, maintained 
its alliance with Syria, and cooperated 
with Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi 
army and other insurgent groups in Iraq.53 
Many analysts have linked Iran’s policies 
with the country’s increasing perception 
of isolation and containment by the United 
States and its allies. 
 These regional and domestic develop-
ments provided a conducive environment 
for the rapprochement between Iran and 
Turkey. The interests of the two coun-
tries overlapped to a great extent in this 
period, largely due to the American-led 
invasion of Iraq. Both the governments 
and the publics in Iran and Turkey were 
strongly opposed to the invasion of Iraq. 
Turkey went against its long-term U.S. 
ally in March 2003, when parliament did 
not endorse joining the war. For both Iran 
and Turkey, the American invasion meant 
being less able to exert influence over Iraq 
and domestic clients such as the Kurd-
ish and Shia groups. In addition, due to 
their own domestic Kurdish populations, 
Iran and Turkey have been wary of the 
disintegration of Iraq and the rise of an 
independent Kurdistan. Islamism has also 
contributed to the rapprochement between 
the two countries.54 
 Economic factors played a role in 
both countries’ increased interest in better 
relations. AKP foreign policy included the 
spreading of Turkey’s influence through 
its economic power as a “trading state.”55 
Iran’s economic capacity, its large do-
October 2001, resulted in assurances from 
Iran that it would prevent the PKK from 
launching attacks into Turkey. Turkey also 
promised to cease political support for the 
National Liberation Movement of South 
Azerbaijan, an organization operating in 
the state of Azerbaijan. Iran’s domestic po-
litical struggle between reformist President 
Khatemi and conservatives also contributed 
to Tehran’s willingness to decrease tensions 
with its neighbors.52 
The Great Rapprochement, 2003 Onward
 In November 2002, an Islamist party 
in Turkey won enough votes to form a 
government without a coalition partner 
for the first time in history. Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) governments 
have continued to rule Turkey since then, 
changing the course of Turkey’s foreign 
policy, as well as its relations with Iran. In 
its first three years, the AKP government 
focused on improving relations with the 
European Union and, to some extent, with 
the United States. The AKP, whose lead-
ers were members of the former Islamist 
RP (Welfare Party), sought international 
recognition and legitimacy. Therefore, the 
AKP focused on improving relations with 
Western countries in order to consolidate 
its position both at home and abroad. Dur-
ing this period, the AKP gained control 
of foreign-policy making in Turkey by 
strengthening its authority over the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, the TAF, and 
various bureaucratic institutions, as well as 
public opinion. The backbone of post-2005 
Turkish foreign policy was built during 
this period. The relationship with Iran was 
not at the top of the AKP’s foreign-policy 
agenda during 2003-05.
 In this period, Iran’s most important 
foreign-policy concern was the chang-
ing global and regional fallout from the 
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 The rapprochement between Turkey 
and Iran since 2002 may seem puzzling, 
given their historical rivalry. We argue, 
however, that the two decided to cooper-
ate due to the changes and challenges 
caused by superpower penetration into the 
region since 9/11. They have made com-
mon cause in order to resist superpower 
policies and other alliances. To resist 
superpower penetration into the region by 
means of the Afghan and Iraq wars, the 
two regional powers decided to cooperate. 
Turkey and Iran have attempted to coun-
terbalance the United States, especially 
regarding the future of Iraq, the Kurds in 
the region and the Palestinian question. 
Turkey and Iran have stated their opposi-
tion to dismembering Iraq and creating 
an independent Kurdish state, thereby 
shaping the policy options of both Wash-
ington and Baghdad. Iran has continued its 
support for groups such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas, and Turkey mediated Syrian-Is-
raeli and Israeli-Hamas  relations until De-
cember 2008. After Operation Cast Lead, 
Turkey’s criticism of Israel’s policies in 
the Gaza Strip rose to an unprecedented 
level. Ankara has also criticized Israel’s 
nuclear arsenal and U.S. tacit approval of 
it. All these developments approximated 
Turkish and Iranian foreign policies in the 
Middle East together. In spring 2010, after 
Turkey voted against sanctions on Iran at 
the UNSC and the flotilla crisis56 occurred 
between Israel and Turkey, it seemed as 
if Middle East politics was determined by 
Turkey’s and Iran’s counterbalancing of 
the U.S.-Israeli alliance.  
THE FUTURE
 Relations between Iran and Turkey 
will focus on three areas in the near future: 
economic relations, political/regional 
concerns and the nuclear issue. An initial 
mestic market and its energy resources 
meshed with this aim. On the other hand, 
Iran perceived Turkey as a “black knight” 
in the event that the United Sates and the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed 
economic sanctions. To break its economic 
and political isolation, Iran found support 
from Turkey, a NATO member and EU 
candidate and therefor a valuable asset for 
its foreign-policy aims. Finally, growing 
dissent in Iranian Kurdistan led Tehran to 
cease support for PKK activities against 
Turkey, effectively weakening the Turk-
ish foreign-policy elite’s security-oriented 
perspective and the TAF’s traditionally 
cautious attitude toward Iran. 
 In the post-2005 period, a growing 
disappointment with the course of the 
EU-membership negotiations led Ankara 
to further develop its relations with Middle 
Eastern states. The negotiations have been 
effectively blocked by the Cyprus issue and 
Franco-German opposition to Turkey. This 
led the AKP’s more conservative Islamist 
wing to increase its influence in foreign 
affairs. Particularly after Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s former adviser, Professor Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, was appointed minister of 
foreign affairs, the Turkish foreign-policy 
focus on Muslim nations in the Middle East 
gained new momentum. Turkey not only 
improved its relations with Iran and Syria 
in various areas; it disagreed with Israel 
and the United States on issues such as 
Israel’s military operations in Lebanon and 
Gaza. Since 2007, Turkey has been sup-
portive of Iran’s nuclear program as long 
as it is used for peaceful purposes. Bilateral 
trade has risen to unprecedented levels, 
new energy-transportation deals have been 
made and others are being negotiated. 
There has also been some military coopera-
tion to fight the PKK. Diplomatic visits and 
friendly relations have burgeoned. 
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thaw in economic relations occurred in 
1996, gaining momentum since 2002. De-
spite both countries’ enormous potentials, 
their trade volume did not even exceed $1 
billion during the 1990s.57 This was due 
to serious political and security problems. 
After Turkey and Iran began to settle their 
differences regarding the PKK, the Muja-
hedin el-Khalq and Iraq, however, eco-
nomic relations began to improve. A first 
step was Turkish President Ahmet Sezer’s 
visit to Tehran in 2002, following the post-
2001 collapse of the Turkish economy and 
new developments in the political relations 
of the two countries. In 2002, bilateral 
trade amounted to $1.2 billion;58 in 2009, 
it surpassed $10 billion. In March 2009, 
Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of 
understanding to improve land, sea and air 
transportation in order to increase the trade 
volume to $20 billion.59 Iran’s first vice 
president, Mohammed-Reza Rahimi, an-
nounced that the Turkey-Iran trade volume 
reached $11 billion in 2009. Rahimi added 
that Iran desired to increase this number to 
$30 billion in the next five years.60 
 Turkey’s increasing trade volume and 
economic ties with its neighbors have been 
mainstays of its foreign policy during the 
AKP years. Turkey is more industrial-
ized than surrounding countries, and AKP 
policy makers aim to turn this into an 
advantage in foreign affairs. Therefore, ex-
porting manufactured goods and services 
to Iran in return for gas and oil appears to 
be a beneficial policy. On the other hand, 
improving economic ties with Turkey 
also has political consequences for Iran, 
as Turkey has preferred to improve eco-
nomic relations in spite of UN sanctions. 
Turkey has already defied warnings by the 
United States not to further improve gas- 
transportation deals with Iran, Turkey’s 
second-largest natural-gas supplier. The 
first pipeline agreement between the two 
was signed in 1996. Today, Turkey buys 15 
percent of its LNG (liquefied natural gas) 
from Iran. Since 2008, the two countries 
have been negotiating deals to improve 
cooperation and the construction of pipe-
lines that would transport Iranian gas to 
European markets. The Nabucco project, 
which will transport Caspian gas to eastern 
and central European markets to decrease 
Europe’s dependency on Russian gas, is 
likely to be at the center of discussions in 
the near future. In case Azerbaijan’s gas 
supplies prove inadequate, Turkey and Iran 
propose gas exports from Iran to European 
markets via Turkey. The United States and 
some EU members oppose the inclusion of 
Iranian gas for political reasons. The AKP 
government is likely to side with Iran on 
this matter if the latter’s involvement in 
Nabucco proves necessary in the future.
 The most important regional issue will 
continue to be Iraq and the Kurds. Since 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a U.S.-led 
coalition, Turkish and Iranian opinions 
have converged, and this trend is likely 
to continue in the near future, particularly 
regarding the territorial unity of Iraq. 
If Turkish-Iranian security cooperation 
against the PKK is maintained, Turkey 
will be more likely to cooperate with Iran 
on other matters as well. However, the 
Kurdish issue is only of secondary interest 
to Iran. Iran’s major concern is its relation-
ship with the United States. If Iran-U.S. 
relations deteriorate, Iran could destabilize 
Iraq to a great extent. 
 Regarding other issues involving 
Iraq, however, Turkey and Iran may find 
themselves at odds. If the Shia-Sunni rift 
becomes unmanageable, the AKP gov-
ernment is more likely to side with Iraqi 
Sunnis, while Iran will support the Shia. 
Turkey has also built good relations with 
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sure on the AKP government to a great 
degree, and within the party, there is a 
debate about the future of Turkish foreign 
policy. As general elections will be held 
in 2011, Erdoğan has to address criticisms 
of his government’s foreign policy and 
relations with Iran. If he takes a pragmatic 
stance for his political survival, a revision 
of Turkey’s foreign policy both on Iran and 
the Middle East might be expected. If AKP 
loses the elections, a new government is 
less likely to maintain its pro-Iran policy.
CONCLUSION 
 There is an inherent structural rivalry 
between Turkey and Iran. Cultural, geo-
graphic, political, ideological and eco-
nomic factors are the constants that have 
shaped their relationship. Iran and Turkey 
have competed for leadership of the Mus-
lim world since the early modern ages and 
persist even today, although at a regional 
level. However, a rapprochement between 
the two has been observed in the last 
decade to balance the increased American 
penetration into the region.  
 The invasion of Iraq and the subse-
quent failure of the U.S.-led coalition to 
fully control the country have induced a 
thaw in Turkey-Iran relations and shaped 
their cooperation. Both countries are on 
the same page concerning the future of the 
Kurdish autonomous region and the ter-
ritorial integrity of Iraq, although Turkey’s 
worries about the Kurds are greater than 
Iran’s. A pragmatic cooperation against the 
PKK has been achieved. Iran and Turkey 
also support Palestinian movements and 
have been critical of Israel’s policies in 
Lebanon and Gaza. Both countries are 
wary of Kurdish movements in the re-
gion and, if cooperation concerning the 
PKK and other groups can be maintained, 
Turkey will be more likely to collaborate 
Sunni Arab countries in the Gulf over the 
past years, and this would affect its poli-
cies towards further Sunni-Shia conflict. 
 Iran’s nuclear program and Turkey’s 
attitude towards it are likely to be the 
greatest challenges in the near future. De-
velopments in 2008-09 confirmed that Iran 
has advanced its nuclear program and the 
possibility that it could produce a nuclear 
bomb in the future.61 The Obama admin-
istration’s “engagement policy” has failed 
to bring about a diplomatic solution to the 
problem, and sanctions against Iran were 
passed at the UNSC in May 2010.  
 Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP 
leadership have been defending Iran’s right 
to develop peaceful nuclear technology in 
the last few years, even offering to medi-
ate between Iran and the West. The Turk-
ish prime minister repeatedly stated that 
Turkey is against nuclear proliferation in 
the region; yet, the government believes 
Iran’s nuclear technology is “solely for 
peaceful purposes.”62 The Turkish govern-
ment has also referred to Israel’s nuclear 
program and argued for a nuclear-free 
Middle East. The Erdoğan government’s 
policies against Israel reflect the AKP’s 
ideological stance as much as its interest-
based foreign policy.63 As a non-permanent 
member of the UNSC, the Turkish govern-
ment voted against the sanctions on Iran in 
May 2010. Emphasizing the importance of 
the nuclear-swapping agreement brokered 
by Turkey and Brazil earlier that month, 
Turkey claimed sanctions will not resolve 
the Iranian nuclear issue. 
 The AKP government has faced inter-
national pressures for voting against sanc-
tions at the UNSC, as Turkey is a NATO 
member, a long-term ally of the United 
States and a candidate for EU membership. 
Siding with Iran on the nuclear issue and 
the crisis with Israel has increased pres-
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June 2009 elections and the protests that 
followed. A weakened regime could turn 
to domestic affairs rather than focusing 
on foreign relations; in Turkey, if the AKP 
loses the elections in 2011, the new gov-
ernment may not be so pro-Iran. Only time 
will tell what turns the structural rivalry 
and recent rapprochement between Turkey 
and Iran will take.
with Iran on other matters as well. Sec-
tarian conflict in Iraq may also shape the 
two countries’ relations; they may find 
themselves supporting opposing factions. 
The political rapprochement, however, is 
strengthened by bilateral economic deals 
that are useful to both economies. 
 Finally, domestic political factors will 
be important for the future of the relation-
ship. Iran has been destabilized since the 
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